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Unrequited Faith
Recruiting the CEF 1914-1918
R O B E R T  C R A I G  B R O W N  & 
D O N A L D  L O V E R I D G E
E d ito r ’s Note: I f  there is one book that signalled sustained academ ic 
interest in the F irs t  World W ar’s im pact on Canada it was Craig Brow n  
and Ram say Cook, Canada 1896-1921: A Nation Transformed (Toronto 
1974). When P rofessor B row n undertook the project he was already at 
work on his path-breaking biography of S ir  R obert Borden, the wartim e 
prim e m inister, and he also produced a series of papers that have sim ilarly  
endured as foundational studies. Am ong them was an exam ination of 
conscription, from  the perspective of the inefficiencies and then collapse 
of volunteer recruiting efforts of 19 14 -19 17 , that P rofessor B row n co­
authored with PhD  candidate D onald M. Loveridge. It appeared in  a 
1982 collection, edited by P rofessor D esm ond M orton, that m arked the 
burgeoning work by Canadian historians in  m ilitary subjects, and is still 
a standard reference. The original publication had lim ited distribution, 
and we were delighted when P rofessor B row n agreed to its republication. 
It is reprinted here in its original form .
[Original introduction by Desmond Morton]: Few episodes in Canadian 
history left more lasting scars on national unity than the Conscription 
Crisis of 1917. Before the wartime government of Sir Robert Borden 
invoked the Military Service Act to keep the Canadian Corps up to 
strength, three years of recruiting campaigns had exhausted every 
appeal to pride, patriotism, escape and shame. Most historians have 
treated the recruiting campaigns as a mismanaged failure. Craig Brown 
and Donald Loveridge have taken a second look at efforts which drew 
half a million volunteers from a predominantly native born and rural 
population of less than eight million.
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In what is perhaps the first detailed, statistical analysis of 
Canadian recruiting for the Canadian Expeditionary Force during 
the First World War, Brown and Loveridge look closely at regional 
variations, the role of the old militia and new voluntary agencies and 
the factors which eventually drove the government to conscript men 
for overseas service.
On  t h e  m o r n i n g  of October 2, 1914 some thirty thousand Canadian soldiers found themselves crowded into thirty ships 
lying at anchor in Gaspe Basin, impatiently waiting the assembly of 
warships which would escort them to war. Those on deck soon spotted 
the imposing figure of Colonel Sam Hughes, Minister of Militia and 
Defence, in full uniform, proceeding in a launch from ship to ship. 
Colonel Sam, never one to miss an occasion for attention-grabbing, 
was passing out thick bundles of his farewell message to his boys. 
“Soldiers” the valedictory proudly proclaimed, “The world regards 
you as a marvel.”
By now the men of the First Contingent were all too familiar 
with Colonel Hughes’ penchant for exaggeration. Among them were 
hundreds of recent immigrants who had served in the British army. 
They, at least, knew that a few weeks of drill and rifle practice had 
not made the Canadians into the efficient fighting force they would one 
day be. The Minister’s message, the official historian of the Canadian 
Expeditionary Force records, was received “with mixed feelings.”1 
That did not matter to Hughes. His 900 word statement was 
intended for another, more important, audience. Carefully worked 
into the patriotic prose and inspirational verse was his account of the 
miracle of Valcartier; how he, not quite single handedly, had created 
a training camp on the sandy banks of Jacques Cartier River a few 
miles from Quebec City and assembled there the eager volunteers 
from the cities, towns and farms of Canada.
Within six weeks you were at your homes peaceful Canadian citizens. 
Since then your training camp has been secured; three and a half miles of
1 Colonel A. Fortescue Duguid, Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great 
War 19 14-19 19 , vol. 1, 104. See also Colonel G.W.L. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary 
Force, 19 14-19 19 , 31.
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rifle ranges—twice as long as any other in the world—were constructed; 
fences were removed; water of the purist quality was laid in miles of 
pipes; drainage was perfected; electric light was installed; crops were 
harvested; roads and bridges were built; Ordnance and Army Service 
Corps buildings were erected; railway sidings were laid down, woods 
were cleared; sanitation was perfected so that illness was practically 
unknown, and-thirty-three thousand men were assembled from points 
some of them upwards of four thousand miles apart. You have been 
perfected in rifle shooting and today are as fine a body— Officers and 
Men— as ever faced a foe.2
Four years later, at 6:30 on the morning of November 11, 
Canadian Corps Headquarters was advised that all hostilities would 
cease at 1 1  a.m. At the appointed hour an unaccustomed, almost 
eerie quiet settled over the lines. The first moment of victory was a 
time for reflection. In England, a Canadian soldier, recuperating from 
his wounds, wrote that “the people are taking the good news very 
quietly. ... Nearly every family has lost someone, and a great many 
two or three sons.”3 And, despite the joyous celebrations that erupted 
from Halifax to Victoria a few hours later, so it must have been in 
the hundreds of thousands of Canadian families which had sent one 
or more of their boys to war.
So much had changed since Colonel Hughes had directed his 
launch to and fro in Gaspe Basin. His original contingent had grown 
into a Corps of four divisions and supporting arms, commanded, after 
June 1917, by a civilian soldier from Canada, Lt. General Sir Arthur 
W. Currie.4 Hughes himself was no longer Minister of Militia and 
Defence, having been fired by the Prime Minister, Sir Robert Borden, 
in November 1916. His Department was now run by Major General
2 Cited, Duguid, Official History, Appendices, no. 149, 122-23. For other accounts 
of the chaos and the accomplishment of the training at Valcartier see Duguid, 
Official History, chs. 1-2 , Nicholson, CEF, ch. II, and Robert Craig Brown, Robert 
Laird Borden, A Biography, Vol. 2, 19 14 -19 37 , 12 -15 .
3 Nicholson, CEF, 482-84; Metro Toronto Library, Baldwin Room, Neil Family 
Papers, “Harry” to “Dear Bros and Sisters,” November 10, 1918.
4 On Currie see H.M. Urquhart, Arthur Currie: Biography of a Great Canadian 
(Toronto, 1950); J.A . Swettenham, To Seize the Victory: The Canadian Corps in World 
War l, (Toronto, 1965); A.J.M . Hyatt, “Sir Arthur Currie and Conscription: A Soldier’s 
View,” Canadian Historical Review, L, 3, September, 1969, 285-96; and R. Craig Brown 
and Desmond Morton, “The Embarrassing Apotheosis of a ‘Great Canadian’: Sir Arthur 
Currie’s Personal Crisis in 19 17,” CHR, LX, 1, March, 1979, 41-63.
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Montreal Tramways Company car 508, being used as an information and recruiting 
point in Victoria Square, for the 148 th Overseas Battalion ca. 19 16 . [Library and Archives 
Canada PA 164705]
S.C. Mewburn, a Liberal member of Borden’s Union Government, 
and its staff had grown from 919 employees in 1914 to more than 
5700 administrators, clerks and typists. Since Hughes’ departure, 
many of them worked in a separate Ministry of Overseas Forces with 
headquarters in London.5 The voluntary recruiting that supported 
the c e f  through the first years of the war had been replaced by 
conscription in 1917. On Armistice Day 105,016 conscripts were 
available for service of whom 96,379 were on strength and 47,509 had 
already proceeded overseas.6 One of Hughes’ inspirations, a “Shell 
Committee” to act as an agency for British munitions contracts 
in Canada, had been undermined by scandal and replaced, late in 
1915, by the Imperial Munitions Board, directed by businessman
5 On the Overseas Ministry see the fine history by Desmond Morton, of the Overseas 
Ministry and the C EF 1914-1920, (forthcoming, Toronto 1982).
6 Nicholson, CEF, Appendix “E ,” SSI. Colonel Nicholson’s figure of 96,379 on 
strength includes 16,296 draftees on unexpired harvest or compassionate leave. On 
conscription and the implementation of the Military Service Act see, inter alia, J.L, 
Granatstein and J.M. Hitsman, Broken Promises. A History of Conscription in Canada 
(Toronto, 1977) chs. 1-3; Robert Craig Brown and Ramsay Cook, Canada, 1896-1921. 
A Nation Transformed (Toronto, 1974) ch. 13 and Brown, Borden, 2 chs. 8-10,
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Sir Joseph Flavelle and employing thousands of men and women in 
munitions production.7
When Hughes issued his first chaotic call for troops the nation 
was in the midst of a sharpening depression. Manufacturers reported 
that their plants were operating at less than fifty percent of capacity. 
Local correspondents of the Labour Gazette detailed the news of 
young men on the move everywhere, going from town to town, looking 
for a job. By 1918 the munitions workers in Flavelle’s factories were 
only a tiny fraction of an industrial army, working overtime in plants 
and mines, in a booming war economy. And Canada’s farmers were 
producing and selling more agricultural products, at higher prices, 
than they ever had before. By 1917 there were serious shortages of 
manpower in the factories and on the farms of Canada, shortages as 
threatening to the war effort as the reinforcement crisis in the c e f  
which forced the passage of the Military Service Act.8
The manpower crisis had its roots in the hasty, unlimited 
commitments made by the Borden Government in August, 1914. The 
first was a decision to send whatever number of men were needed 
overseas to fight. Characteristically, Hughes announced in New York 
City on October 7, 1914, that “we could send enough men to add the 
finishing touches to Germany without assistance either from England 
or France.”9 In Halifax in December Borden was more moderate but 
equally sanguine about his military manpower policy. Would, he was 
asked, the expeditionary force eventually reach 100,000 men? “I prefer 
to name no figure,” he replied. “If the preservation of our Empire 
demands twice or thrice that number, we shall ask for them.”10
That was easy to do in the winter of 19 14 -15 . Borden, like his 
counterparts in London and Paris still anticipated a quick, decisive 
victory. And, up to that time, the countless hours he had spent 
trying to boost production in Canada with orders from the Allies 
for war material had yielded only disappointing results. The second
7 The history of the Imperial Minister’s Board is described in David Carnegie, The 
History of Munitions Supply in Canada 19 14 -19 18  (New York, 1925) and in Michael 
Bliss’s excellent biography, A Canadian Millionaire: The Life and Business Times of 
Sir Joseph Flavelle, Bart., 1888-1939  (Toronto, 1978), chs. 10 - 13  and 15.
8 For a brief sketch of the Canadian economy during the Great War see Brown and 
Cook, Canada, 1896-1921, ch. 12.
9 Cited, J.C . Hopkins, ed., Canadian Annual Review, 1914, (Toronto, 1915), 217.
10 Cited, Brown, Borden, 2, 22.
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commitment made in August, 1914, to seize the opportunities of war 
to revive the Canadian economy, remained an empty dream.
There was one more pledge that was easy to give in December, 
1914. As Borden talked about raising men for the c e f , he observed 
that “Canada will answer the call as readily and as fully as its men 
[have] volunteered since August. There has not been, there will not 
be, compulsion or conscription.”11
The commitments to raise as many men and produce as many 
goods as necessary never changed during the Great War. But, as the 
war dragged on, with such an appalling wastage of manpower, and 
as war production steadily increased, it became ever more difficult to 
recruit men for military-service. An examination of the administration 
of military manpower policy during the war and its relationship to the 
demand for labour in factories and on farms provides an interesting 
insight into the history of the c e f . It is not possible, in this short essay, 
to survey recruiting for all units of the c e f . Instead, we will analyse 
the recruiting of infantry battalions, the largest single portion of the 
Expeditionary Force. Unlike earlier discussions of this subject, our 
study will be based on the effective military force, i.e., the men shipped 
overseas, rather than on the men who enlisted for service, of whom tens 
of thousands were discharged in Canada for a variety of reasons.12
The raising of the First Contingent under the personal direction of 
Colonel Hughes was marked by confusion and chaos. Discarding a 
prepared plan of mobilization in the Military Districts across Canada, 
the Minister initially ordered each Local Militia unit commander 
to enrol men for a divisional contingent and send nominal rolls 
to Ottawa. There followed a flurry of amendments, additions and 
contrary instructions which confused and exasperated the local
11 Ibid.
12 Colonel Duguid’s figures indicate that 616,557 enlisted in the CEF, either 
voluntarily or by compulsion. Of these, 421,510 or 68.4% served overseas. Some 
explanation of the difference may be found in remarks to the House of Commons 
by Sir Edward Kemp on July 6, 1917. He then explained that 76,000 of the 425,000 
who had volunteered for service had been discharged in Canada. The largest groups 
discharged were medically unfit (33,887), absentees struck off (13,081) and men “not 
likely to become efficient” (5,345). Duguid, Official History, 51; Canadian Annual 
Review, 19 17, 307, 3 11 .
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and District Officers as they tried to process the eager applicants 
for overseas service. Eventually 30,621 men, including 19,299 in 17 
c e f  infantry battalions and another 1071 in a separately organized 
battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, found their 
way to the ships awaiting escort in Gaspe Basin.13
The men came from 130 Militia units from every region or 
Canada. Significantly, more than sixty percent were raised in urban 
areas and almost half of the men, 48.4%, came from western Canada 
where the effects of the depression were most severe. Another 31.3% 
came from heavily industrialized Ontario.14 Many of these soldiers 
were among the tens of thousands of unemployed men who had been 
looking for work in the summer of 1914. For them the army at least 
would provide shelter, clothing, food and $1.10  a day. Even measured 
against the hazards of military life, that was better than the prospect 
of spending another bitter winter on the streets of Canada’s cities.
The other remarkable fact about the First Contingent was 
that sixty percent of its men had been born in the British Isles. 
Undoubtedly many of them had a more profound sense of the threat 
the war posed to the Empire than did young Canadians of military 
age. But unemployment also affected their decisions to enlist. 
Canada was a nation of immigrants and more than ten percent of 
the population came from the British Isles. A very large proportion 
of these British immigrants were single males of military age and this 
was especially true in the western provinces where the number and 
proportion of single British-born males far exceeded that in any of the
13 See Appendix “A ” and Duguid, Appendices, no. 84, 51-53.
14 In this paper we are not using the contemporary Canada Census distinction 
between urban and non-urban populations. Instead, we use a much more limited 
definition of urban recruiting that developed from recruiting patterns from 1914 to 
1917, distinguishing between battalions recruited exclusively in defined urban areas 
and those recruited over larger areas. So defined, our definition of urban includes 
Quebec City and Montreal in Quebec; Toronto, Hamilton and London in Ontario; 
Winnipeg and St. Boniface in Manitoba; Regina, Moose Jaw  and Saskatoon in 
Saskatchewan; Calgary and Edmonton in Alberta; and Vancouver, New Westminster 
and Victoria in British Columbia. The pattern of recruiting is defined in the reports 
of the Inspectors General on the battalions raised and because no battalions were 
raised exclusively in urban areas in the Maritime region, all battalions from that 
region have been classified as non-urban. Obviously, however, this classification, 
which is necessary for consistent analysis, greatly undervalues the recruitment of 
men in urban areas across Canada.
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eastern provinces.15 Unemployment, therefore, and a comparatively 
large number of single British-born males in the population, in large 
measure account for the extraordinary large contribution that the 
western provinces made to the manpower of the First Contingent and 
to the next phase of voluntary recruiting.
The second phase of voluntary recruiting, for First Contingent 
reinforcements and a second contingent, began before the first men 
had reached England. It was far more orderly than the first. Perhaps 
the chaos at Valcartier convinced Hughes that a more systematic 
approach was necessary; perhaps his absence in England, leaving 
the administration of his Department, in the more capable hands of 
Major-General W.G. Gwatkin, Chief of the General Staff, and Major- 
General Eugene Fiset, the Deputy Minister, explained the change. 
In any case, preliminary mobilization and training of recruits was 
delegated to the local militia units in the Military Districts.
Over the next eleven months, through September, 1915, seventy- 
one infantry battalions were authorized. Thirty-four of them not only 
recruited a full battalion but also sent one or more drafts of some 250 
men overseas. Only two, the 70th from Essex, Kent, Lambton and 
Middlesex Counties in Ontario and the 57th from Quebec City, failed 
to send a full strength battalion overseas. Again the largest number of 
men came from western Canada, 41.4% of the total, closely followed 
by Ontario’s contribution of 38.3%. Twelve percent of the men raised 
in the second phase of recruiting came from Quebec in four French 
and six English-speaking battalions. Eight percent of the men were 
recruited in the Maritime Provinces in six full strength battalions, 
two of which also sent extra drafts overseas.16
In the Quebec and western military districts a clear distinction 
between recruiting in urban and non-urban areas developed at the 
beginning of this period and it was beginning to emerge in Districts 
One and Two in Ontario by the end of the period. Seventy percent of 
the men raised in Quebec and sixty percent in the western provinces 
were enrolled in battalions which recruited exclusively in urban areas. In 
Ontario this type of recruiting did not begin until June 1915 and twenty 
percent of the 34,352 infantrymen sent overseas from the Province in 
this phase were raised in Toronto, Hamilton and London battalions.
15 See Tables i , ii and iii located in the Appendix at the end of the article. Also see 
6th Census of Canada, 19 21, Vol. 2, Table 24 and Table 25.
16 See Table iv  located in the Appendix at the end of the article.
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Figure 1: Battalion Recruiting Costs
Advertising $ 2,554
Dodgers, Letters, etc. 1,690
Street cars 464
Postage 220
Signs for depots, etc. 850
Office supplies, telephone, rent, etc. 930
Autos, repairs, etc. 656
Sundries 520
Brass & Bugle Bands 2,000
Two Field Kitchens 2,500
Misc. 1,000
TOTAL $ 13,384
This phase of recruiting also had its problems. Initial training was 
hindered by lack of equipment for several battalions. “The training of 
a unit cannot be pushed far when it has no equipment,” an Inspector- 
General reported of the 58th Battalion at Niagara-on-the-Lake. “ 1/3 
of men have no clothing, 1/2 or more have no shirts. They are short of 
boots and have no ammunition.” Severe weather, winter quartering and 
the departure of local militia officers for overseas service further set back 
training schedules as did a serious outbreak of spinal meningitis in units 
at Toronto’s Canadian National Exhibition grounds and in Belleville 
in the winter of 1914-15. Beyond that, the militia officers training 
the raw recruits had to cope with major disciplinary problems. Three 
hundred men had to be discharged from the 25th and 130 from the 
26th battalions in the Maritimes. In several Ontario units a ten percent 
wastage of manpower because of misconduct discharges was reported. 
The 41st, a singularly ill-fated Quebec battalion, had 88 n c o ’s  and other 
ranks absent without leave on the day the Inspector-General appeared.17
The other responsibility of the militia units, mobilization of recruits, 
was equally troublesome. Raising a battalion for overseas service was 
an expensive business and, apart from the equipment supplied—in due 
course!—by the Government of Canada, the costs had to be borne by 
the local units. One estimate came to more than $13,000.18
17 RG 9, II, B5, vol. 5-7 (Inspectors-General Reports on CEF Battalions), Reports 
on Battalions 19-86. On the 41st Battalion see Desmond Morton, “The Short 
Unhappy Life of the 41st Battalion. C E F ,” Queen’s Quarterly, LXXXI, Spring, 1974.
18 Canadian Annual Review, 1916 , 308. See Figure i .
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Regimental funds were quickly dissipated and fund raising appeals 
had to be launched in the community to cover the costs of recruiting.
Moreover, after the Spring of 1915, when casualty lists became a 
daily feature in the press, the realization dawned that there was not 
going to be a decisive battle: the war was going to be long and difficult, 
and characterized by a shocking wastage of manpower at the Front. 
Now some members of the Militia and self-appointed spokesmen for 
the “better elements” in society banded together in Speakers Patriotic 
Leagues and Recruiting Leagues to assist the Militia’s recruiting 
efforts. But these organizations became increasingly outspoken in 
their criticism of Militia recruiting. The job of mobilization and 
training was too big and too expensive for the Militia to handle. Far 
more men were going to be needed to fight the Kaiser and a much 
greater and more efficient recruiting effort was necessary. The logic 
of the argument, some spokesmen added, was a mere centralized 
recruiting effort, more direct support from the Department of Militia 
and Defence, and a scheme of national registration to rationalize 
recruiting and, perhaps, as a prelude to conscription.19
The response from Ottawa was in exactly the opposite direction. 
Why not, the Government’s new recruiting policy seemed to ask, 
capitalize upon popular clamour for men by handing the responsibility 
for raising battalions over to these zealous patriots? In the fall of 1915 
the Department announced that henceforth the local regiments of 
Militia would be bypassed in the recruiting effort and that individual 
citizens and communities would be authorized to raise battalions on 
their own if they would assume the costs of recruiting.
Given a direct role to play, the patriots, especially in the West 
and in Ontario, responded with unprecedented energy. 123,966 men, 
in 170 battalions, were sent overseas in the final phase of voluntary 
recruiting from October 1915 to October 1917. Sixty battalions, 
33.9% of the total, were raised in the western provinces and another 
75 battalions, 42.4% of the total, in Ontario. Far fewer men were 
recruited in the Maritimes and Quebec, but even in these regions 
the battalions organized, fifteen in the Maritimes and thirteen in
19 On the Speakers Patriotic League and related organizations see Barbara 
M. Wilson, editor, Ontario and the First World War, 19 14 -18 , A Collection of 
Documents, (Toronto, 1977), xxix-xxxvii and 8-21 and R. Matthew Bray, “ ‘Fighting 
as an Ally’ : The English-Canadian Patriotic Response to the Great War,” CHR, 
LXI, 2, June, 1980, 141-68.
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Soldiers recruiting for the Canadians Buffs on Albert Street. Toronto, Ontario, 8 March 1916. 
[Library and Archives Canada PA 072528]
Quebec, exceeded the number recruited by the Local Militia units 
in the preceding phase.20 At first glance this patriotic phase of 
recruiting, with the initiative in the hands of neither local nor central 
military authorities, appears to have been a triumphant vindication 
of voluntarism and local enthusiasm.
A closer look changes the perspective. 72,296 men, almost sixty 
percent of the total, were raised in the first three months of this two 
year period. Another thirty-eight percent were recruited in the next 
six months, following Sir Robert Borden’s announcement on New 
Year’s Day, 1916, that the authorized force level for the c e f  had 
been raised to a half-million men. Then, from July 1916 to October 
1917, a mere 2810 men were raised and sent overseas in infantry 
battalions. The last infantry battalion for c e f  service, the 258th, 
was organized in Quebec in April 1917 by Colonel Pierre-Edouard 
Blondin, Postmaster General in Borden’s Government. It embarked 
in October with 231 men. Blondin’s experience was not unique. The 
last Maritime battalion, organized in August, 1916, sent 247 men 
overseas and the last western battalion, the 251st, raised in Winnipeg,
20 In addition, seven special function Forestry and Railway battalions were raised 
nationally or in more than one region.
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embarked with four officers and 168 other ranks.21 In short, in the 
final phase of voluntary recruiting, enthusiasm peaked in the last three 
months of 1915 and then quickly evaporated. Save for Blondin’s effort, 
not a single infantry battalion was organized in the thirteen months 
from November 1916 to the first call up of conscripts in January, 1918.
What had happened? A large part of the problem can be attributed 
directly to the mode of recruiting authorized in the final phase. Lacking 
central organization and control, the citizens raising battalions engaged 
in ruinous competition for men. Three battalions were organized in 
Toronto in December, 1915, another in January 1916 and six more 
in February, 1916. In that same month at least six battalions were 
recruiting in Winnipeg and three in Edmonton. In the Militia phase 
of recruiting only two battalions, 2.8 per cent of the total, failed to 
recruit to full strength. In the patriotic phase, 120 battalions, 73.6 
per cent of the total, were sent overseas at less than full strength 
and ten battalions, 6.1 per cent of the total, were disbanded. Even 
appeals to men to enlist in special identity battalions seldom worked. 
Thirty-eight such units, Highlanders, Sportsmen, Bantams, Chums, 
Pals, Frontiersmen and others, were organized in this phase. Ten of 
them, including five Highland battalions and one “Dry” battalion 
from Winnipeg, were raised to full strength. But six others had to be 
disbanded and the remainder were all under strength.
Unbridled competition had other devastating effects. As soon as men 
were raised by a battalion’s organizers they were sent back to the streets 
to recruit their friends. Even the most elemental training suffered. The 
240th was raised in Lanark and Renfrew Counties in June, 1916. In 
May, 1917 the Officer commanding Military District 3 wrote:
At the time this unit was formed, recruiting was not very brisk and 
consequently the efforts of all of the officers were devoted to securing men. 
As recruits were obtained they themselves were used as recruiting agents 
especially among their own acquaintances. Training, therefore, was not 
performed on any extensive scale. ... The Commanding Officer appeared 
to consider training of very secondary importance and he devoted much 
of his time to recruiting both for his own and Forestry Battalions.22
The battalion was sent overseas two weeks later with 389 men.
21 Public Archives of Canada, RG 24, vols. 1344-54, File HQ 593-3-25.
22 PAC, RG 9, II BS, Vol. 7. (Inspector General’s Reports).
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Discipline suffered even more. The Inspectors General’s reports 
tell a dismal tale. The 145th and 146th, both in training at Valcartier 
in the late summer of 1916, each lost a hundred or more men in five 
weeks between inspections. The 180th, an Ontario battalion, had 
336 men away without leave when it was inspected and 300 men 
missed parade when the 199th, a Quebec battalion, was inspected. A 
western battalion, the 210th, recruited 1020 men, 732 were left when 
it was inspected; 152 had been discharged and 59 had deserted. Two 
months later, almost 300 more had disappeared. Only 500 officers 
and men embarked for overseas.23 Understrength, poorly trained, 
lacking discipline the Inspectors General repeatedly recommended 
that battalions raised in this phase of recruiting be sent overseas as 
drafts to be amalgamated into previously organized battalions.
But an unorganized recruiting system and competition between 
battalions for men were not the only problems encountered by recruiters 
in the patriotic phase. By the winter of 1915-1916  the Government’s 
plans for domestic war production were falling into place and there 
was a steadily rising demand for manpower in the agricultural and 
industrial sectors of the economy. An Inspector General noted that 
recruiting for the 232nd, a Saskatchewan battalion, had been “very 
poor.” “The reason assigned, [was] not so much the scarcity of men in 
the country but to the demand for labour at an excessively high rate 
of wages.”24 This was true across rural Canada and especially in the 
west where wages for farm labour skyrocketed in the latter war years 
and elaborate schemes were developed to import agricultural workers 
from the United States.25
It was no less true in Canada’s cities where, as in the earlier phases 
of recruiting, the recruitment of men for the c e f  was concentrated. By 
late 1915 war contracts were accumulating in ever increasing number; 
the Shell Committee had been replaced by an agency of the British 
Ministry of Munitions, the Imperial Munitions Board, and hundreds
23 PAC, RG 9, II BS, vols. 5-7.
24 PAC, RG 9, II BS, vol. 7.
25 See The Agricultural Gazette of Canada, III, 1916, 245-48, 351; 1917, 387-93, 
493; and V, 1918, 864-67, 940-44 and Eleventh Annual Report of the Department 
of Agriculture of the Province of Saskatchewan, Regina, 1916. After the entry of the 
United States into the war in 19 17  the supply of American farm labour was greatly 
restricted. As partial compensation for that, and for the movement of agrarian 
labourers into the industrial work force in Canada, a “ Soldiers of the Soil” movement 
was organized in most provinces in 19 17-19 18 .
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of contracts for military supplies for the Canadian Government were 
being distributed by the War Purchasing Commission.26 The result 
was a remarkable explosion of industrial activity in every region of 
Canada, accompanied by corresponding growth in other sectors of 
the economy from mining to transportation to finance.
Because government statisticians used different bases to measure 
the number of industrial workers employed before 1917, no reliable 
figures on the size of the industrial workforce are available for the early 
war years. But Department of Labour estimates of unemployment 
among unionized workers indicate unemployment of union workers 
was below the national average in Halifax, St. John, Toronto, 
Winnipeg, Regina, and Edmonton in at least seven of the eleven 
quarters from June 1916 to December 1918. Other indicators point 
to a similar trend. Between 1915 and 1917 the average rate of return 
on capital invested in manufacturing increased in every province; it 
doubled in Quebec, more than doubled in Nova Scotia and Ontario 
and almost tripled in Manitoba and Alberta. Using 1917 as a base 
year, value added to manufacturing increased more than 10 percent 
nationwide in 1918 and by 12 percent in Ontario and Saskatchewan, 
16 per cent in New Brunswick and 35 per cent in British Columbia.27 
Crude as these indicators are, they strongly suggest that industrial 
production, and its consequent draw on manpower in the urban 
areas of Canada, rose sharply from 1916 on and cut deeply into the 
potential manpower supply for military service.
The organizers of infantry battalions, therefore, not only had 
to compete for men among themselves, but also with the factories 
and shops of Canada. Beyond that, as the Canadian Corps grew 
in size and responsibility, opportunities for enlistment in other 
branches of the service, many of them considerably less risky than the 
infantry, expanded greatly, as did recruiting activity for the British 
flying services, the Royal Naval Air Service and the Royal Flying 
Corps.28 The result was a precipitate decline in enrolment in infantry
26 See, for example, RG 14, D2, vol. 37, Sessional Paper 149, “Second Report of the 
War Purchasing Commission, Jan  1, 19 17  to March 31, 19 18” which lists the bidders 
for and the 2467 contracts awarded during that period.
27 Calculated from quarterly reports in the Labour Gazette, 19 16 -19 19  and from 
statistics on manufacturing in Canada Year Book, 1922-23, 415-16.
28 See Gilbert N. Tucker, The Naval Service of Canada Vol.1, Ottawa, 1952 and 
S.F. Wise, Canadian Airmen and the First World War; The Official History of the 
Royal Canadian A ir Force Vol. 1, Toronto, 1980.
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battalions in urban areas, ending with the meagre contribution, after 
June, 1916, of 172 men from Winnipeg and 297 from Toronto.
Rural areas, where farmers were constantly badgered by the 
Government to increase their acreage and production did no better. 
The five non-urban battalions raised in Ontario after June 1916 
contributed a total of 1124 men, the strength or a single battalion, to 
overseas service. In western Canada only one battalion, the 249th in 
Saskatchewan, was recruited after June 1916. In the following year it 
sent 550 men to Quebec for further training.29
But, if the Government’s military manpower and wartime 
production policies were working against each other, and if infantry 
recruiting had collapsed by the late spring of 1916, why did the 
Government wait for another year to introduce the Military Service 
Act? Many factors delayed the decision. The Government, for 
example, seems to have based its military manpower policy upon 
monthly enlistment figures which grossly understated the forthcoming 
infantry manpower crisis by taking no account of wastage through 
discharge or desertion during the training of men in Canada,30 but 
even the use of embarkation rather than enlistment statistics could 
have been misleading. Because of the long period of time between the 
date when a battalion was recruited and it embarked, thousands of men 
recruited in late 1915 and early 1916 were only being sent overseas in 
late 1916 and early 1917. Thus, Borden and his colleagues could easily 
have concluded in the spring of 1917 that the infantry manpower crisis 
was less serious than, in fact, it was. Finally, as depressing as earlier 
casualty rates were, it was only in 1917 that the fully developed Corps, 
fighting as a complete unit, suffered casualties at a truly alarming rate.
Borden made the fateful decision to impose conscription during 
his trip home from the Imperial War Cabinet meetings in the late 
spring of 1917. At those meetings, and in private talks with Lloyd 
George and other members of the British Government, he had become 
privy, for the first time during the war, to the secret information and 
projections of the British on the duration of the war. Undoubtedly the 
sombre news influenced his decision. Even more was he influenced by 
the tragic spectacle of row upon row upon row of bedridden wounded 
Canadian boys in the hospitals he visited in France and Britain. 
His commitment to their cause and their sacrifice was total and
29 PAC, RG 9, II BS, vol. 7.
30 See footnote 12.
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Cross raised to the memory of the 48th 
Battalion CEF. This cross was raised to 
protest the decision to disband the 48th 
Battalion (also called the 3rd Canadian 
Pioneer Battalion from January 1916) 
in April-May 19 17 , and disperse its 
personnel throughout the Canadian 
Corps. [Library and Archives Canada PA 
005022]
unquestioning. He was answering the “call from the wounded,” “the 
men in the trenches and those who have fallen” he explained on May 
18, 1917 when he announced that there would be conscription.31
The announcement touched off a furious debate in the House of 
Commons. The passage of the Military Service Act and the subsequent 
formation by Borden of a Union Government to implement it have 
been the subject of equally intense argument among politicians and 
historians ever since, as they have calculated the effects of conscription 
upon French-English relations, farmers, trade unions and the Liberal 
and Conservative Parties.
Some facts are beyond dispute. Among the men of military age 
in Canada the response was overwhelmingly negative. Of the 401,882 
Class i registrants, males aged 20 to 32 who were single or widowers 
with no children, no less than 93.7 per cent immediately applied for 
exemption. And tens of thousands more failed to register and became 
defaulters. The number of registrants who volunteered for service or 
reported by order in the initial phase of implementation of the Act 
was tiny, 4.5 per cent of registrants nationally, varying from 10.5 per 
cent in British Columbia to 1.6 per cent in Quebec. In every province
31 Brown, Borden, 2, chs. 7-10.
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and region of Canada, not just in Quebec, it was evident that popular 
enthusiasm for military service had been bled dry.32
Many advocates of conscription argued that a nationally directed 
compulsory military manpower policy was the only way to achieve 
a balanced allotment of military responsibilities between sectors of 
the economy and among regions of the country. Some, playing upon 
long-standing animosities between French and English Canada, 
and obsessed by Quebec’s low rate of contribution to the voluntary 
recruiting effort,33 went further to claim that the Military Service 
Act would, at last, force French Canadians to assume their share 
of the military burden. Driven by the passions of war, few were 
prepared to concede that demographic and historical factors went 
far to explain why Quebec (and, to a lesser extent the Maritime 
Provinces) had contributed comparatively fewer soldiers to the war 
effort than Ontario and the western provinces. As noted above, the 
voluntary recruiting system, at least in its first and second phases, 
was dependent upon the local militia units and was heavily biased in 
favour of recruiting single men. The significantly higher proportion 
of single males of military age, both native Canadians and British 
immigrants, in the West and in Ontario, and the deep roots of 
the militia in Ontario society help to account for the high rates of 
recruitment in both regions. By contrast, the proportion of males of 
military age who were married was well above the national average in 
Quebec and the Maritime Provinces and the militia exercised much 
less influence in the societies of the Maritime Provinces and had 
frittered away by neglect whatever modest attractions it had once had 
in French Canadian society.34 The bias towards recruiting in urban 
areas also helps to explain why French Canadians failed to respond 
to the voluntary recruiting effort. Not only did the vast majority 
of French Canadians live outside the two largest cities of Quebec,35 
but only one quarter of the battalions recruited in the Montreal and
32 See Canada, House of Commons, Sessional Papers, 1919, no. 246, 86. Also see 
Table v located in the Appendix at the end of the article.
33 Across Canada 12.33% of the military age group (males 15  to 44 years of age in 
19 11)  had enlisted in infantry battalions and embarked for overseas service before 
the implementation of the Military Service Act. By region the rates were: Maritimes, 
9.96%; Quebec, 4.69%; Ontario, 14.42% and Western Canada, 15.52%. See Table I 
located in the Appendix at the end of the article.
34 See Morton, Ministers and Generals, passim and Canada and War. A Military 
and Political History, Toronto, 1981, chs. 1-2.
35 See 5th Census of Canada, 19 1 1 ,  vol. 2, 357-65.
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Quebec districts sought to attract French Canadian recruits.36 In 
short, in the Maritime provinces, and even more so in Quebec, the 
smaller proportion of single males of military age in the population, 
a concentration on urban recruiting and a legacy of neglect of French 
Canadians in the Militia go far to account for the failure of men in 
those regions to respond to the voluntary recruiting effort.
Conscription did tend to balance out the military manpower 
contribution of the regions. Though still below the national average 
of 5.6 per cent of the military age group made available for service 
under the Military Service Act, Quebec’s contribution of 5 per cent 
matched Ontario’s 5.1 per cent and approximated the 5.5 per cent 
contribution from the Western Provinces.37 But it was grudgingly 
given. The number of defaulters was exceedingly high, even when 
account is taken of confusion in the counting and classification of 
defaulters in the Hull office of Military District 3 and in Districts 
4 and 5.38 Only 1.6 per cent of Quebec’s Class i registrants reported 
for service; 98 per cent applied for exemptions. And Appeal Tribunals 
rejected only 9.3 per cent of exemption claims as compared with 13 per 
cent in the Maritime and Western regions and 15 per cent in Ontario.39
Too much, however, can be made of Quebec’s, or French 
Canada’s opposition to conscription, implying, as it does, that there 
was substantially more support for the Military Service Act in other 
regions of the country. That doubtless was true among the politicians 
supporting the Union Government and the voters in Ontario and 
Western Canada in the 1917 election. It certainly was not true among 
the Class i registrants in any region of the country. Among them, one 
broadly based group, the farmers of Canada, illustrates the point. 
In comparative terms they had been left alone during the voluntary 
phases of recruiting and they were no more willing to be coerced than 
they had been to be coaxed into military service. Promised exemptions
36 In contrast, in New Brunswick, where recruiting was not concentrated in 
identifiable urban areas, five of the seven infantry battalions contained large numbers 
of Acadian recruits.
37 See Table vi located in the Appendix at the end of the article.
38 See Sessional Paper 246, 1919, 138-40; 145-48.
39 See Table v located in the Appendix at the end of the article. It should not be 
assumed that reference to Quebec in this paragraph refers only to French-speaking 
Canadians living in the Province. The statistics available for administration of the 
MSA in Quebec do not differentiate between French and English speaking registrants. 
Moreover, the 98% rate of claims for exemptions indicates the unpopularity of 
conscription among all Class I registrants.
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by the Unionist Government candidates in the 1917 election campaign, 
97.4 per cent of the farmers who were Class i registrants applied for 
exemptions. Only 12.6 per cent of those claims were refused by the 
Tribunals established under the Military Service Act.40
The Government’s solicitous regard for agrarians apparently came 
to an abrupt end, however, when Sir Robert Borden announced the 
cancellation of all exemptions and the call up of all 20-22 year old 
Class i registrants in April, 1918. Farmers in every region of the country 
were outraged and charged that the exemption premise had been a 
cheap political trick. It mattered not that the call up was Borden’s 
response to the roll back of Allied armies before the German spring 
offensive on the Western Front. A Nova Scotia farmer complained to 
his Member of Parliament that “this conscripting farmers is the worst 
slur on the conservative government yet.”41 District registrars for the 
Military Service Act reported that the cancellation of exemptions was 
“generally unpalatable,” “created a measure of consternation” and a 
“ feeling of resentment” among farmers.42
But the effect of the cancellation upon the farming community 
was, in fact, not as severe as it appeared. Registrars were instructed 
to take care to avoid conscripting hardship cases, to grant and renew 
harvest leaves, and to grant leaves of absence on compassionate 
grounds. More significant still, registrars were ordered “to call the men 
with urban addresses in priority to those living in country districts.” 
Reflecting upon the effect of the cancellation in his final report, the 
registrar in Halifax “did not observe that the farming industry was 
seriously handicapped by this call, and the fishing industry was very 
slightly affected. Large industrial concerns in the mining and steel 
centres were more seriously affected.”43
The otherwise comprehensive report of the Director of the 
Military Service Act does not indicate how many young farmers 
were called for service as a result of Borden’s announcement. But 
if we assume a constant proportion of 20-22 year old farmers to all 
20-22 year olds with exemptions, 31.9 per cent, through the process 
of cancellation and calling up, then only 17,146 young farmers were
40 See Table vii located in the Appendix at the end of the article.
41 Provincial Archives of Nova Scotia, M.G. 2, E.N. Rhodes Papers, vol. 580, no. 
8951, letter to Rhodes, May 9, 1918.
42 Sessional Paper no. 246, 1919, 139, 149, 136.
43 Ibid., 132, 17, 136.
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called up.44 If we add farmers who reported for service and who had 
exemption claims denied to those whose exemptions were cancelled, 
42,098 farmers, 25.3 per cent of farmers who registered, were called 
for service under the M.S.A. 71,363 non-farmers reported for service 
or had their exemptions denied or cancelled, 29.1 per cent of non­
farmer registrants. In western Canada the bias towards farmers was 
much sharper. 23.3 per cent of western farmer registrants and 39.3 
per cent of non-farmers were called for service.45
Thus, if the administration of the Military Service Act tended to 
bring more balance into the manpower contributions of the regions of 
Canada, it was less effective in balancing the contribution of farmers 
and non-farmers to the military manpower effort. In fact, the more 
liberal policy toward farmers that existed during the voluntary 
recruiting period was codified in the regulations made under the 
Military Service Act both before and after the call up of the 20­
22 age group. In part the favouritism of agrarians was accidental; 
voluntary recruiting tended to centre upon urban areas of high 
population density. In part it was a matter of design; ever increasing 
agricultural production for export was an essential component of the 
Government’s war policy.
But so too was industrial production for the war effort and our 
examination of the recruiting of infantry reveals that the conflict 
between military manpower policy and industrial policy surfaced 
during the winter and early spring of 1915-1916, long before the 
agrarians raised their powerful protest against the Military Service 
Act. Indeed, given the patterns of voluntary recruiting, that conflict 
undermined the voluntary recruiting system and precipitated the 
conscription crisis.
The history of Canadian manpower policy in the Great War, 
climaxing in the conscription crisis, has been characterized by a 
distinguished military historian as a story of “broken promises.”46 That 
it was; from Borden’s 1914 pledge that there would be no conscription 
to the 1917 election promise to exempt farmers. Yet, from another 
perspective, it could just as convincingly be called a story of unrequited
44 Total 20-22 with exemptions =  104,149; total 20-22 farmers with exemptions 
=  33,284 or 31.96%; total 20-22 exemptions cancelled =  65,610 (31.96% total =  
17,146); Total 20-22 gp. Called for service =  53,649 (31.96% total =  17,146).
45 Calculated from Tables vi and v ii located in the Appendix at the end of the article.
46 Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, chs. 1-3 .
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South African monument with recruiting 
sign. Toronto, Ontario, 1 September 19 15. 
[Library and Archives Canada PA 071675]
faith: faith, initially, that the war would quickly end; faith that the 
patriotic response of the people of Canada would enable the country to 
send as many men as necessary to the Front and, at the same time, be 
a major supplier of war material; faith that even with an inadequate 
bureaucracy and little planning somehow, someway, everything would 
come out right. Most especially, faith in the principle of voluntarism.
In the end, faith was not enough. Applied to the military manpower 
policy in an ever more decentralized system of voluntary recruiting, it 
was dashed by the duration of the war, the appalling wastage of men 
at the Front, and the Canadian Government’s own wartime economic 
policies. But even when coercion became necessary, the legacy of faith 
in voluntarism tempered the coercive nature of the Military Service 
Act. Under the liberal exemptions policy in the Act, 86.8 per cent of 
all claims for exemption were allowed: only 28 per cent of all Class i 
registrants were called for military service.
Reflecting upon Borden’s decision in 1916 to raise the authorized 
force level of the c e f  to 500,000 men, Sir Thomas White, the Minister 
of Finance, wrote that “We simply went on faith, feeling instinctively 
that means could be found to enable us to carry it out.”47 That simple
47 Cited, Brown, Borden, 2, 34.
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confession spoke volumes about Canada’s military manpower policy, 
from the guns of August to Armistice Day.
A BOU T TH E  AUTHORS
This paper was first written for the Revue Internationale d ’Historie Militare, 
No. 51, 1982, which was edited by Professor Desmond Morton, then a 
professor of history at the University of Toronto. Robert Craig Brown , 
professor of history at University of Toronto, who had recently completed 
his two-volume biography of Sir Robert Borden, joined Donald Loveridge, 
a doctoral candidate at University of Toronto who was preparing a thesis on 
early settlement patterns in Manitoba, to develop a statistical analysis of 
recruiting for the c e f  during the First World War.
A PPEN D IX
Table i: Military Age Groups 
Male Population 15-44 Years Old in 1911
Province or Region
15-44 Male 
Population % Total
PEI 19715 1
Nova Scotia 111184 5.9
New Brunswick 77904 4.1
Maritime Provinces 208803 11 .1
Quebec 442703 23.4
Ontario 638079 33.9
Manitoba 132571 7
Saskatchewan 167608 8.9
Alberta 129444 6.9
British Columbia 162229 8.6
Western Canada 591852 31.3
CANADA 1888825 100
Source: Canada Year Book, 19 13 , 82-84.
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Province or Region Number
% Canadian 
Born
% British 
Born
% Foreign 
Born
PEI 31370 96.68 2.61 0.7
Nova Scotia 166 ,870 89.27 7.58 3.17
New Brunswick 116626 92.8 4.35 2.84
Maritime Provinces 314866 91. 32 5.88 2.81
Quebec 627002 89 5.46 5.54
Ontario 925948 71.42 19.42 9.16
Manitoba 172989 43.21 30.5 26.29
Saskatchewan 206 ,889 38.61 23.9 37.49
Alberta 162346 31.3 25.22 43.48
British Columbia 205657 28.78 34.59 36.62
Western Canada 747 ,881 35.38 28.65 35.96
CANADA 2623820 67.68 17.08 15.24
Source: 6th Census of Canada, 19 2 1, Vol. 2, Table 24, 118-19.
Table ill: Military Age Groups
Single Males 15 and Over -  Canadian, British and Foreign Born in 1911
Province or Region Number
% Canadian 
Born
% British 
Born
% Foreign 
Born
PEI 12952 97.79 0.67 1.54
Nova Scotia 72600 90.93 5.59 3.49
New Brunswick 50840 93.92 2.9 3.17
Maritime Provinces 136392 92.69 4.12 3.18
Quebec 287115 90.59 3.96 5.44
Ontario 380 ,689 75.1 16.29 8.61
Manitoba 82660 55.76 23.76 20.47
Saskatchewan 110505 44.92 18.93 36.14
Alberta 91174 37.51 21.34 41.16
British Columbia 84 ,492 39.17 32.77 28.09
Western Canada 368 ,831 44.19 23.78 32.03
CANADA 1175285 71.18 14.24 14.59
Source: Ibid.
23
and : Unrequited Faith Recruiting the CEF 1914-1918
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2015
84 • Unrequited Faith
Table iv : Strength of Infantry Battalions Raised in Canada Before Military Service Act
T im e p erio d  o f  
O rganization
Total no. B attalions
F u ll plus 
drafts Full
F u ll to h a lf  
strength
Less than h a lf  
strength D isb a n d ed
A u g  -  S e p  1 9 1 4
F i r s t  C o n t i n g e n t
16 1x
x  1 7 th  B a t t a l i o n  h a d  s a i l in g  
s t r e n g t h  o f  6 6 5 .  D u g u i d  
A p p e n d ic e s ,  # 8 4 ,  p p .  5 0 -5 1 .
17  T o ta l  B n s .
O c t  1 4  -  S e p  15
3 7 3 2 2
71  T o ta l  B n s .
O c t  1 5  -  D e c  15
2 5 52 7 1
8 5  T o ta l  B n s .
J a n  16  -  J u n  16
2* 13 ** 2 9 * * * 2 1 7 +  I n c l u d e s  5  s p e c i a l  f u n c t i o n  b a t t a l i o n s  r a i s e d  a c r o s s  C a n a d a .
7 2  T o ta l  B n s . 
F r o m  J u l  16
13  T o ta l  B n s .
3**** 8 2
x  E x c lu d e s  2  b a t t a l i o n s  r a i s e d  f o r  
S i b e r i a  i n  1 9 1 8 .
+  I n c l u d e s  2  s p e c ia l  f u n c t i o n  
b a t t a l i o n s  r a i s e d  a c r o s s  C a n a d a .
258 Total B ns. 39 86 87 3 6 10
Source: Calculated from RG 24, vols. 1344-54, File HQS 93-3-25 (Embarkation Reports) 
* Both special functions.
** Two special functions 
*** One special function.
**** Two special functions.
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